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This paper is devoted to the logical problem of 
conditionals. This is interpreted as the problem of 
formulating, in terms of simple non-modal logical notions, 
the general conditions for the truth of statements of the 
•if...then---* form. It is argued in the first part of 
the paper that the compass of this analysis properly in­
cludes not only those conditionals expressed counter- 
factually with verbs in the subjunctive, but also those 
containing the verbs of the indicative. This view is de­
fended through a series of arguments condensing in the 
conclusion that the appropriate mood for the verbs in a 
conditional is not determined by the kind of implication 
the writer or speaker claims between antecedent and conse­
quent, but rather by opinion as to the probable truth or 
falsity of the antecedent. The second part of the paper 
is then given over to the search for a general definition 
for the truth of conditionals. An elaborate set of rules 
is finally formulated and claimed to provide an adequate 
analysis of the conditional. Difficulties shared by the 
problem of conditionals and that of explanation are men­
tioned, and it is suggested that counterexamples to earlier 
versions of the criterion for conditionals can be imitated 
to establish counterexamples to deductive-nomological 
models, and further that the necessary adjustments can be 
















Conditionals in English are those ordered sentence 
compounds signaled by the connective constructions: "if... 
then--," "...only if--", "had,..then--", and "...unless--". 
Conditional expressions are common in our everyday conver­
sations, in the most lofty theoretical discourse, and in 
the most impassioned personal deliberations. But despite 
their importance and their pervasiveness, we stand without 
an adequate answer to the basic question: When is a con­
ditional true? The Stoics and Megarians of ancient Greece 
vigorously debated the correctness of various answers; the 
dispute became so well-known that Callimachus found it 
fair game for an epigram: 'even the crows on the roof tops 
caw about the nature of conditionals.1
Philo of Megara argued for the truth-functional inter- 
I
pretation: 'If P, then Q' if and only if *-(P&-Q).‘ Others 
insisted that a conditional was true only if it was not 
possible for its antecedent to be true and its consequent 
false. Today these two opposing views have found a com­
fortable compromise in the current wisdom which accepts 
Philo's answer for conditionals with indicative verbs while 
admitting the modal formulation as a vague, but concise, 
statement of the distinctive quality that characterizes 
conditionals with verbs in the subjunctive.
1W & M Kneale, The Development of Logic. Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 1962, p 128.
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Indeed, it is generally recognized that the proper 
analysis of conditionals with subjunctive verbs is not the 
truth-functional one, and that such conditionals call for 
a much more elaborate analysis. However, in this paper it 
will be argued* that this more elaborate analysis is equally . 
t^ie one called for by conditionals with indicative verbs; 
that the considerations usually put forward to underscore 
the inadequacy of a truth-functional interpretation for 
conditionals with verbs in the subjunctive testify as well 
against a truth-functional analysis for conditionals in the 
indicative; and further that the mood of a conditional is 
merely a device for expressing opinion as to the probable 
truth or falsity of the antecedent clause, and thus that it 
is not a device for signaling the kind of implication 
claimed between antecedent and consequent.
The utility of the truth-functional interpretation for 
assessing validity is not to be denied. But when our inter­
est is in the truth of a conditional, and not in the valid­
ity of an argument, then the truth-table is as useless for 
determining the truth of an indicative conditional as it 
is for determining the truth of a conditional expressed in 
the subjunctive. Both the indicative and the subjunctive 
demand the more elaborate analysis.
The second part of this paper will be devoted to the 
problem of providing the requisite analysis. This is the 
problem usually referred to as the problem of subjunctive 
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or counterfactual conditionals, though the first part of 
this paper will argue that this is better described more 
simply as the problem of conditonals.
This problem is usually thought to have as a major 
component, the task of defining natural or non-logical law. 
However, responsibility for this definition is appealed 
here on the following grounds: (1) that the task of defin­
ing non-logical law is a more general problem, one playing 
a major part in a number of other important projects in 
epistemology and the philosophy of science, and hence not 
one unique to the problem of conditionals; and (2) that the 
relations between the problem of (counterfactual) condition­
als and the problem of law are not so intimate as the rumors 
suggest; more specifically that counterfactuals do not pro­
vide a criterion of lawlikeness.
The point of (1) can be illustrated through an anal­
ogy with someone attempting an analysis of knowledge through 
definition of the two-place predicate *s knows that p.’ 
Suppose for the purpose of the illustration that the first 
three clauses in his proposal are: (a) ’p' is true; (b) s 
believes that p; (c) s has undefeatable evidence that p. 
Its author could reasonably protest that the problem of 
defining the nature of truth and that of defining the nature 
of belief are so general that the burden of definition 
should not be his. But, on the other hand, he would have 
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to admit that the problem of defining the general character 
of undefeatable evidence is sufficiently narrow to support 
the denial of a similar plea for relief from the labor of 
its exact definition. To draw out the analogy, it is thus 
claimed that the problem of defining 'natural law* is on 
a par with that of 'truth* and 'belief, and further that 
the task of specifying the relevant conditions presumed, 
but unstated, in the assertion of a conditional, is analo­
gous to that of defining 'undefeatable evidence' for example 
in attempting an adequate interpretation of 's knows that p'.
The second charge, that the connection between the 
problem of conditionals and that of law is not so intimate 
as it is generally reputed to be, can be supported by a 
simple counterexample to the claim that counterfactual con­
ditionals provide a criterion for lawlikeness, that is to 
Hempel's claim that "a law can, whereas an accidental gen­
eralization cannot, serve to support counterfactual condi- 
tionals,"2 Against this note that the counterfactual:
"If a rock had been taken out of this box, then it 
would have been one containing iron."
is supported by the accidental generalization;
"All rocks in this box contain iron."
^Carl Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science. Prentice 
Hall, Inc. p 56
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The assumption that accidental generalizations will 
not support counterfactuals probably persists because it is 
so easy to find counterfactuals that are not supported by 
accidental generalizations. Counterfactuals that cannot 
be supported by the often cited accidental generalization 
"All men in this room understand English" are indeed plenti­
ful, e.g. "If an Eskimo, a baby, Plato, or Mr, Khrushchev 
were in this room, then he would understand English.*1 How­
ever, supportable counterfactuals are also abundant, e.g. 
"If an actor, Hume, Peter Pan, or Nixon had read an English 
translation of The Misanthrope to the men in this room, 
they would have understood it."
Dispensing with the burden of defining the nature of 
non-logical law does not clear away all the serious problems, 
as.it will soon be seen.
CHAPTER I
Conditionals are sentences. They are usually compound 
sentences of the form: "if...then---." Sentences for the 
purposes of this investigation can be thought of as univer­
sals where each sentence is viewed as a repeatable pattern 
for physical inscriptions, or as a repeatedly approximable 
norm.l With this interpretation, it cannot be said of every 
conditional, any more than it can be said of every declar­
ative sentence, that it is definitely true or false. Only 
the dated individual inscriptions can be said to be true or 
false absolutely, and then only with respect to their au­
thors when the sentences include the indexicals of personal 
reference. Those conditionals in which the individual 
components are eternal sentences (sentences whose truth 
values stay fixed through time and from speaker to speaker) 
will of course be true or false absolutely. But when the 
component sentences are not eternal, only the dated indivi­
dual inscriptions ascribed to a certain author will unswer­
vingly abide by the principle of the excluded middle. In­
dividual inscriptions, however, can be eternalized by 
including specific references implicit in context,
J-This position is nearly that of Quine in Word and 
Obiect(Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1960). See pages 
191-195 where he begins his 'Flight from Intension,* for 
a fuller discussion of sentences as universal repeatable 
patterns of utterance.
2
By convention, the first component of a conditional 
cast in the form of the familiar "if.then--" is usually 
referred to as its antecedent, and the second component as 
its consequent. We can speak of the truth or falsity of 
the antecedent and consequent by imagining an eternaliza- 
tion of the sentences in question. There is, however, a 
difficulty in this when the verbs in the conditional are 
subjunctive and each component is an ungrammatical affair 
like the collocation "Dotson were happy" that appears in 
the perfectly well formed conditional:
If Dotson were in Boston, he would be happy.
We can bend the general convention to accomodate such ex­
pressions by taking the antecedent and consequent of each 
subjunctive conditional to be the first and second indica­
tive sentences named in equivalent.expressions patterned 
after paraphrases of the form:
If 'Dotson is in Boston* were true, then 'Dotson is happy' 
would be true.
Of course, the quoted sentences must first be eternalized 
before quotation, but otherwise the conversion we imagine 
proceeds rather smoothly. The names and definite des­
criptions in the first component are simply repeated in 
place of their pronominal representatives in the second 
component. The subjunctive verbs in the ungrammatical 
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sequents then give way to indicative correlates while what­
ever point they added to the sense of the original express­
ion is picked up again when they reappear in the predicates 
affirming the truth of the sentences in quotation.
The process wrinkles somewhat, however, when the con­
ditional in question is what Goodman calls, a countercom-
2parative. Consider for example:
(i) If I had arrived one minute later, then I would have 
missed the train.
The paraphrases we imagine for the countercomparatives 
should not result in the self-contradictory components pro­
duced by the naive use of the conversion formula, e.g.
(ii) If 'I arrived one minute later than I arrived* were 
true, then * I missed the train* would have been 
true.
Goodman suggests a translation procedure which he claims 
appropriate for the troublesome countercomparatives. He 
notes that the self-contradictory component disappears 
when we translate (i) as the quantified whole:
(iii) (3t) (t is a time. I arrived at t. If *1 arrive 
one minute later than t* were true, then *1 missed 
the train* would be true.)
An obvious objection to this as a paraphrase is that it
^Nelson Goodman, Fact. Fiction, and Forecast. (Ind­
ianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) p.6-7
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represents the speaker as countenancing an ontology that 
includes temporal instances. A more formidable objection 
takes note of the fact that sentence quotation produces an 
opaque^construction.3 No variable inside an an opaque con­
struction can be bound by a quantifier outside it. The 
trouble becomes clear when we look at an immediate alpha­
betic variant of (iii) thus:
(iv) (3w) (w is time. I arrived at w. If *1 arrive one
minute later than t* were true, then *1 miss the 
• train* would have been true.)
Without the cross-reference that is blocked by the sentence 
quotation, the point of the paraphrase is irrevocably lost.
A solution to the problem, which undoubtedly has al­
ready been recognized, is found in the eternalization of 
the component sentences. The indexical 'I* and the vari­
able *t* can be replaced with a name of the speaker and a 
definite description of the time in question; thus, the 
impossibility of binding a variable occurring in an opaque 
context never poses a problem. For example, there is no 
self-contradictory component in the possible expansion of 
(i) as followsi
(v) If Fitchmeyer arrived at the Creekwood station at 
10:07 P.M. on V.E. Day* were true, then 'Fitchmeyer 
missed the ten o'six from Springfield on V.E. Day' 
would have been true.
1
3I owe this point completely to M.G. Yoes, though its 
manner and the remed y I suggest are not ones for which he 
should be held responsible.
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If one finds need of a paraphrase that succeeds without 
demanding additional information from the context of utter­
ance, a reparsing along the lines of the following should 
be appropriate:
(vi) (3t) (t is time, I arrived at t. If I arrived one 
minute after t, then I missed the train.)
With this tack cross-reference is secure, no opaque con­
texts are generated, and no additional information beyond 
that implicit in the original utterance is required for the 
conversion. We abandon the subjunctive verbs, but not 
their force? intimation of the antecedent's falsity is re­
tained through the emergence of the second conjunct: ‘I 
arrived at t*.
Nevertheless, some may argue that the paraphrase in 
(vi) fails in that the connection affirmed between the 
antecedent and consequent in the original subjunctive for­
mulation (i) is much stronger than that affirmed by its 
indicative replacement. This objection holds only if the 
proceeding chapters fail to establish the claim that the 
mood of a conditional is only designed to indicate some­
thing about it’s author's opinion as to the probable truth 
or falsity of the antecedent, and hence that the mood is 
not a signal as to whether the connection between anteced­
ent and consequent is affirmed as lawful or as truth­
functional.
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Regardless of whether the omission of the subjunctive 
verbs in (vi) is or is not a legitimate move, trouble re­
mains if adequate paraphrases for the countercomparatives 
are held to be only those unaided by context. We needn't 
go far to find countercomparatives that resist conversion 
through paraphrases such as (vi). Consider, for instance, 
the common refrain:
"If only I had more money, then I would...."
Given some information as to the standard unit of currency 
we can of course imitate the tact in (vi); but if allowed 
the advantage of context, we might as well exploit eter­
nal! zat ions of the component sentences to achieve para­
phrases after the manner of (v). Whether or not recourse 
to context is legitimate in formulating paraphrases for 
countercomparatives is not a question that must be decided 
here. For we need not have the final paraphrase procedure 
in hand, it is enough that such a procedure may eventually 
be realized. This much is sufficient to anchor the con­
vention adopted here, viz. conceiving of the antecedent 
and consequent of each subjunctive conditional as the first 
and second quoted sentences arising in paraphrases of the 
form: "If 1...' were true, then *-- ' would be true."
Under this convention the antecedent and consequent are 
always syntactically well-formed indicative sentences sub­
ject to the labels, 'true* and 'false*.
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CHAPTER II
The problem of conditionals is usually thought of as 
the problem of counterfactual conditionals, for it is gen­
erally assumed that conditionals with indicative verbs are 
more or less susceptible to a truth-functional analysis, 
and thus that only those with subjunctive verbs and a 
hint of counterfactual implication require a more elabor­
ate analysis.
Before confronting this assumption directly, it would 
perhaps be worthwhile to pause for a moment to consider 
the intended application of the expression "counterfactual 
conditional." The term is almost invariably introduced 
into discussions by way of an illustration rather than by 
a definition. This practice would not be so troubling if 
a definition were at least attempted somewhere later in the 
proceedings. This unfortunately is rarely, if ever, the 
case. Usage would at least suggest that "counterfactual" 
is coextensive with "subjunctive" when applied to condi­
tionals, The use of the subjunctive verbs however may only 
reflect the fact that the antecedents of these conditionals 
are presumed false.
Goodman’s introduction to his landmark article on ’The 
Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals* may shed some light 
on this issue:
What, then, is the problem about counterfactual condi­
tionals? Let us confine ourselves to those in which 
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antecedent and consequent are unalterably false--as, 
for example, when I say of a piece of butter that was 
eaten yesterday, and that had never been heated
If that piece of butter had been heated to 150* F., 
it would have melted.
Considered as truth-functional compounds, all counter- 
factuals are of course true, since their antecedents 
are false. Hence
If that piece of butter had been heated to 150* F., 
it would not have melted
would also hold. Obviously something different is 
intended, and the problem is to define the circumstances 
under vfriich a given counterfactual holds while the op­
posing conditional with the contradictory consequent 
fails to hold.
Goodman’s explanation seems to suggest that it is the fal­
sity of the antecedent rather than the subjunctive mood 
that defines the counterfactual, since:
If that piece of butter was heated to 150* F., it melted.
and:
If that piece of butter was heated to 150‘F., it did not 
melt.
would also be true if considered as truth-functional com­
pounds. And here too "obviously something different is 
intended," for surely no one who claims the latter intends 
agreement with someone asserting the former, or vice versa. 
But perhaps this is not so obvious, as it runs counter to 
the prevalent view protested in the next section concerning 
^-Nelson Goodman, Fact. Fiction, and Forecast. (Indian­
apolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) p. 4
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the unique strength of the implication asserted by condi­
tionals with verbs in the subjunctive.
In addition to the question of whether the subjunc­
tive mood is an essential feature of those conditionals 
intended by the term ’counterfactual,’ there is also some 
question as to the significance of the falsity or lack of 
falsity in the consequent. Is it, for example, a necessary 
condition for the truth of a counterfactual, or for an 
expression's being a counterfactual at all, that its conse­
quent, like its antecedent, be false? If it is a necessary 
condition for the truth of a counterfactual, then half of 
the solution to the problem of counterfactual conditionals 
is at hand, given that "the problem is," as Goodman explains, 
"to define the circumstances under which a given counter- 
factual holds while the opposing conditional with the con­
tradictory consequent fails to hol^.''^ For the circumstances 
under which the opposing counterfactual with the contradic­
tory consequent, i.e.
If that piece of butter had beenheated to 150T., it would 
not have melted.
fails to hold, are simply those in which its consequent is 
true, that is, when the piece of butter in question did not 
melt. Surely the problem of counterfactual conditionals
^Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. (Indian­
apolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) p. 4* 
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is not so tame. This much seems certain, and might be 
taken as a reductio ad absurdum for the supposition that 
the falsity of the consequent is a necessary condition for 
the truth of a counterfactual. Thus, we might suppose 
that it is rather a necessary condition for an 'if-then* 
expression's being a counterfactual. Either way, it seems 
we would have to give up Goodman's partial description of 
the problem as that of defining the circumstances in which 
one of two opposing counterfactuals fails to hold. This 
consequence in itself is not difficult to accept, since 
a very serious problem still remains, i.e,, that of defin­
ing the circumstances under which a given counterfactual 
holds. However, it is perhaps worth mentioning that Goodman's 
method throughout his analysis of counterfactuals is to 
argue against successive proposals by calling attention to 
pairs of opposing counterfactuals which would appear to 
hold under the proposal in question. This approach will 
not do if it is either a necessary condition for the truth 
of a counterfactual or for an expression's being a counter- 
factual that its consequent, like its antecedent, be false.
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CHAPTER III
Is a stronger and less tractable form of implication 
introduced into a conditional when the included verbs are 
subjunctive? Does the subjunctive conditional thus call 
for a special analysis basically different from the one re­
quired for the indicative conditional? We have already 
seen that the subjunctive verbs necessitate a twist in the 
usual convention for marking the antecedent and consequent 
of a conditional; but the question here is whether the con­
trast is such that the indicative conditional can be identi­
fied more or less with a simple truth-function while only 
those conditionals with subjunctive verbs actually demand 
the more elaborate analysis.
In this chapter it will be argued that the difference 
in mood does not reflect a major difference in the requi- 
I 
site analysis. The opposing opinion is well represented 
by W.V. Quine. Quine agrees that usage of the subjunctive 
conditional is at variance with the truth-functional inter­
pretation represented by the truth table for material im­
plication, but he claims that "there is no clear conflict 
between the [truth} table and the indicative conditional of 
ordinary usage'.'1 He. holds that "the indicative conditional can 
iW.V. Quine, Mathematical Logic. (New York, 1940) 
pp. 16, 17.
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always be construed truth-functionally--even though its 
affirmation will ordinarily be motivated by considerations
2of causal connection." Therefore, Quine claims that the 
subjunctive or "contrafactual conditional is best dissoc­
iated from the ordinary conditional in the indicative mood." 
He arguess
Whatever the proper analysis of the contrafactual 
conditional may be, we may be sure in advance that^ 
it cannot be truth-functional; for, obviously or­
dinary usage demands that some contrafactual condi­
tionals xizith false antecedents and false consequences 
be true and that other contrafactual conditionals 
with false antecedents and false consequents be 
false.
But if we are to be consistently sensative to the "demands 
of ordinary usage", we must also say- that the indicative 
conditional cannot be identified xvith a truth-function.
For ordinary usage also seems to demand that some indica- 
I
tive conditionals with false antecedents and consequents 
be true and that some be false, for example (when Jones 
is in Virginia) that: 
"If Jones is in Carolina but not in South Carolina, then 
he is in North Carolina" 
be true, and that: 




"Jones is in Carolina only if he is in South Carolina"
be false. My purpose here will not be to champion ordinary 
usage, but simply equal treatment, i.e,, to point out that 
the considerations of ordinary usage that underscore the 
inadequacy of the truth-functional analysis for the sub­
junctive conditional count as well against a truth-functional 
interpretation of the indicative conditional.
We say that a method of statement composition is 
truth-functional if and only if replacement of a component 
statement by another statement of like truth-value does not 
alter the truth-value of the compound. For example, we 
hold that conjunction is a truth-functional mode of state­
ment composition since the truth of the whole is indiffer­
ent to any substitution of like valued statements. Some 
statement compounds are unquestionably non-truth-functional, 
for instance, the sentence:
a) Tom is sad because Mary left him.
By replacement of a component statement with another state­
ment of like truth-value we can alter the truth-value of 
the whole:
b) Tom is sad because he won the derby.
Tom's sadness may have mellowed with victory, but it is 
unlikely that his victory was the cause of his sorrow.
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'Because* we must agree is simply no.t a truth-functional 
connective.
Similar observations with conditionals show that * if* 
like * because*--is not a truth-functinnal connective. Con­
sider, for example, the indicative conditionali
c) Tom will have a wife two years his senior if he marries 
his cousin.
If Tom vras born two years before his cousin, then (c) must 
be granted as true, regardless of whether Tom marries or 
does not marry his cousin. But if he does not marry her, 
and the false statement, 'Tom marries his cousin*, is 
supplanted by some other false statement such as 'Torn mar­
ries his younger sister*, we obtain a patent falsehood:
d) Tom will have a wife two years his senior if he mar­
ries his younger sister.
Indeed, there is no sure preservation of truth-value upon 
the substitution of a like valued component in an indica­
tive conditional such as (d). Thus, it would appear that 
the indicative conditional cannot be readily identified 
with a truth-function.
This of course is a rather uncontroversial conclusion 
Few would argue that the indicative conditional can be 
accurately identified with a simple truth-function. But 
nevertheless, if just this much is admitted, then it must 
be granted that the subjunctive conditional does not differ 
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from the indicative in the failure of the truth-functional 
analysis. Other crucial lines of divergence may of course 
be found.
Quine claims that the subjunctive conditional differs 
from the indicative conditional in that the latter suffers 
a truth-value gap whenever its antecedent is false.He 
proposes closing truth-value gaps to smooth over the awk­
ward humps in communication that arise when the antecedent 
of a conditional with indicative verbs is false. However, 
it will be maintained here that this artificial treatment 
is not only unreasonable but actually unnecessary. Indeed, 
there is something awkward about entertaining a conditional 
with indicative verbs when we are cognizant of the falsity 
of its antecedent; but it is grammatical in kind, and can 
be eliminated quite simply by changing the mood of the 
verbs. When the falsity of the antecedent in a conditional 
with indicative verbs, e.g.
"If Tom rides Kentucky Prince, he will win the derby" 
produces a hump in communication, the difficulty is more 
naturally resolved if we reissue the point in the subjune- 
tiVe than if we were to artificially rule that the condi­
tional be labeled true no matter what the verdict is for its




If Tom were riding Kentucky Prince, he would win the derby.
This kind of move is not at all foreign to the common course 
of conversation. In general, discovery of the antecedent’s 
falsity prompts reiteration of the point at issue through 
a parallel compound cast in the subjunctive when the speak­
er's interest extends beyond the contingencies of the mom­
ent.
The view that the indicative conditional suffers a 
truth-value gap whenever its antecedent is false has some 
fairly paradoxical results. For instance, one would expect 
its adherents to accept as a possible formulation of their 
position (and hence as true):
e) If every indicative conditional has a false antecedent, 
then every indicative conditional has a truth-value 
gap.
But, of course, since this is an indicative conditional 
with a false antecedent one would also expect them to be­
lieve that it lacks a truth-value? thus, it seems they must 
accept both the statement that (e) is true (that it has a 
truth-value) and the statement that (e) does not have a 
truth-value. They might say that they were simply in error 
if the conditional was not diagnosed as suffering a truth­
value gap when it was first introduced. But what then 
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could they say about its logically equivalent contra­
positive*
e’) If some indicative conditional has a truth-value, then 
some indicative conditional does not have a false 
antecedent.
which has a true antecedent, and therefore must somehow be 
spared the pain of a truth-value gap? The discord cannot 
be attributed to a contrived and improbable example; for 
any indicative conditional marked with the symptoms of a 
truth-value gap (false antecedent and consequent) has as 
its contrapositive an equivalent, but curiously robust, 
expression with true antecedent and consequent.
Those who urge Quine’s view could avoid the conflict 
either 1) by showing that the rule of contraposition does 
not hold apart from a formal interpretation in which all 
the truth-value gaps are first closed, or 2) by revising 
their position to allow that truth-value gaps occur equally 
in conditionals in which both antecedent and consequent 
are true. Let us consider the two ploys separately:
(1) Stalnaker, (though not a proponent of the truth­
value gap interpretation), argues that contraposition, 
while valid for the truth-functional horseshoe, is invalid 
for the conditional:
For an example in support of this conclusion, we take ano­
ther item from the political opinion survey:
18
•If the U.S. halts the bombing, then North Vietnam 
will not agree to negotiate.*
A person would believe this statement if he thought that 
the North Vietnamese were determined to press for a complete 
withdrawal of U.S. troops. But he would surely deny the 
contrapositive.
•If North Vietnam agrees to negotiate, then the U.S. 
will not have halted the bombing.*
He would believe that a halt on the bombing, and much more 
is required to bring the North Vietnamese to the negotiat­ing table. 6
Nevertheless, one wrinkle in the wide spread of condition­
als for vrtiich contraposition goes through would not seem 
to warranties immediate dismissal; moreover, the charge of 
invalidity, it will be maintained, is better directed at 
the opinion survey than at contraposition. The conditional 
in question would most likely be understood as the semi- 
factual j
f) Even if the U.S. halts the bombing, North Vietnam still 
won't agree to negotiate.
while its wording in the survey forms
g) If the U.S. halts the bombing, then North Vietnam will 
not agree to negotiate.
is'better suited, for querrying opinion as to whether a U.S. 
bombing halt would cause North Vietnam to refuse negotia­
tions. If someone did actually claim to believe that a U.S.
^Robert C. Stalnaker, "ATheory of Conditionals", 
American Philosophical Quarterly. Oxford, 1968 p 107 
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bombing hale would somehow cause North Vietnam to refuse 
negotiation, then he should have registered the same res­
ponse to the contrapositive of (g), i.e., to
h) If North Vietnam agrees to negotiate, then the U.S. has 
not halted the bombing.
In fact, if the pollster was really employed to ascertain 
public opinion on (g) rather than on (f), then (h) should 
have been included along with, but not of course adjacent to 
(g) as one of the items on the survey questionnaire to al­
low a check on the internal consistency of the interviews. 
Those forms in which the response to (g) and (h) differed 
could then have been discarded as unreliable data for 
an accurate estimate of the public's present persuasion as 
to proper course to follow in ending the war.
If contraposition is not valid for conditionals it 
would seem that modus tollens would also be invalid , since 
contraposition can be derived simply from modus tollens and 
the deduction theorem. But Stalnaker claims that "although 
contraposition fails, modus tollens is valid for the condi­
tional,**^ Thus according to his position one who believes 
( g) could consistently deny its contrapositive, (h), but 
all the same from:
j) North Vietnam agrees to negotiate
7lbid.
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be prepared to infer:
j) The U.S. has not halted the bombing.
This seems extremely odd, for a denial of (h) would surely 
appear to be the natural way of gainsaying any inference 
from (i) to (j). Since (h) is nothing more than the con­
ditional 'If (i), then (j)', Stalnaker must also argue for 
the invalidity of conditional proof. But the wiser course 
would be to give up the original claim and admit that con­
traposition, like modus tollens. is valid for the condi­
tional.
(2) If contraposition is vindicated, the advocates 
of Quine's position must admit that the indicative condi­
tional with true antecedent and consequent suffers the 
same truth-value gap as its contrapositive with false ante­
cedent and consequent. Allowing this would not seem to 
involve any special difficulty for their view. Neverthe­
less, it means that the second line, TF, is the only line 
in the truth table that the material conditional shares 
with the indicative conditional, and in this it is surely 
no different from the conditional in the subjunctive mood.
All of these consequences may be admitted, the impor­
tant question remains to be asked. Why suppose truth-value 
gaps at all? Why for instance, should we represent Toby's 
claim:
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If Hawkshaw saw me, the jig is up.
as suffering a truth-value gap if Hawkshaw is blind while 
readily deeming it false if Toby later chances to speak 
in the. subjunctive:
If Hawkshaw had seen me, the jig would be up.
and Hawkshaw is actually a fellow collaborator, and not 
the police agent Toby mistook him for.
When an indicative conditional of no theoretical con­
cern is put on exhibit without sufficient brief, one might 
well be tempted to speak of it as suffering a truth-value 
gap when its antecedent is false; however, the gap it suf­
fers should not be attributed to the indicative verbs, but 
rather to the gap in the author's specification of refer­
ence, context, and relevant information, e.g. of 'Toby*, 
1 
the jig, and Hawkshaw's employ.
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CHAPTER IV
The notion that a stronger and less tractable form" 
of implication is introduced into a conditional when the 
included verbs are subjunctive is not confirmed by the 
grammatical considerations that regulate the mood of such 
sentences. The mood of a conditional is chosen to accord 
with opinion as to the probable truth or falsity of its 
antecedent clause. When Toby opens with the indicative:
"If Helen is even somewhat attractive,..." 
we can guess that Toby has not yet seen Helen, but when we 
later overhear his comment in the subjunctive:
"If Helen were even somewhat attractive,..."
we surmise that he has seen Helen, and that he is not now 
I
in her presence if he has any tact at all. If the mood of 
a conditional is decided by its author's opinion as to the 
truth or falsity of the antecedent (or by the one he wishes 
to affect), then the mood of a conditional cannot be sup­
posed a function decided by the degree of connection its 
author wishes to affirm between antecedent and consequent. 
The two conventions would be at odds whenever one wishing 
to affirm the stronger connection also wishes to express 
his open-mindedness with respect to the probable truth of 
the antecedent. Thus, we either run the risk of piquing
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Tom's sister with:
"If Tom were honest...."
or we fail to express the strength of our claim by using:
"If Tom is honest...."
Similarly, the conflict would arise whenever one wished to 
assert the weaker connection while evidencing his belief 
in the antecedent's falsity. The problem evaporates if 
we grant that the connective force and the mood of the verbs 
are fully independent. The connection affirmed by a sold­
ier when he reports:
If the mine is stepped on, then it will explode
is the same connection as that affirmed after he learns 
that his trap was circumvented and.maintains:
If the mine had been stepped on, it would have exploded.
The difference in the mood of the two sentences is not 
explained by our supposing in the soldier first a desire 
to assert some weak connection he could defend to his ser­
geant when his faulty preparation of the mine was discovered, 
and then later a surge of courage that prompted him to 
claim a very strong connection between the mine's being 
stepped on, and its exploding. The difference in mood is 
explained by a contrast in the soldier's beliefs before
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and after the enemy’s path was reported. Thus, when he 
believed it quite possible that enemy troops would march 
on the mine, his report was worded in the indicative. But 
later, when he learned that the line of march had changed, 
his replies perforce took on the verbs of the subjunctive.
Admittedly, there are exceptions to the rule requir­
ing indicative verbs in a conditional uttered by one un­
prejudiced as to the truth of the antecedent clause. Indeed, 
one fully open-minded on the question of the antecedent’s 
truth or falsity may use the subjunctive mood for reasons 
of politeness ("If you would), or for reasons of formality 
("as it were"). Sometimes the subjunctive is also used to 
accommodate the views of a listener. For example, in Smith’s 
argument with Jones, Suppose that Jones takes up a line 
of reasoning that begins:
"If the Democrats are right, then thee will be..."
But suppose further that Smith is an ardent Republican and 
the assumption that the Democrats are right is so irritat­
ing and inconsistent with his present set of beliefs that 
he resists assuming even conditionally that they might be 
correct on this point. Hence, he firmly insists:
"But the Democrats are not right!"
Thus, in order to meet the resistance in Smith’s mind to 
the assumption in the antecedent, Jones retreats to a 
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conditional with subjunctive verbst
"But, look, if the Democrats were right, then there 
would be"
With this tact, Jones is able to avoid debate on a question 
of little or no consequence to the shape of his argument 
by using the subjunctive verbs in a conditional with an 
antecedent which he need not believe false or contrary-to- 
fact.1
1A peculiar feature of the subjunctive mood in the 
English language is its antenuated store of distinctive 
verbs, a feature which made it necessary to fill in the 
auxiliary verbs of the consequent clauses in the examples 
above. Out of context the verb in "If the Democrats
For the sake of arguments where our interest goes 
beyond the contingencies of the moment to some broader, poss- 
bily theoretical issue, we can usually carry on the discus­
sion where a conversant balks at a conditional by employing 
the subjunctive. The choice of mood may then be determ­
ined by the resistance we anticipate in the mind of 
our listeners. But in the standard case we only have re­
gard for the needs of avoiding resistance in our own minds. 
Although the hypothetical exchange between Jones and Smith 
does provide an exception to the general rule concerning 
the use of indicative verbs, it also again illustrates 
the fact that the mood of a conditional is not directed by 
the degree of connection tie speaker claims between antece­
dent and consequent, but rather is gauged to comport with 
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opinion over the probable truth of the antecedent clause: 
indicative if his attitude (affected, feigned, or real) 
is'one of open-mindedness, but subjunctive if his belief 
(affected, feigned, or real) is that the antecedent is more 
probably false or contrary-to-fact than true.
Something of the point intended can be seen in saying 
that the same conditional can be expressed by two sentences 
differing only in the mood of the included verbs (used to 
fit the varying attitudes of the speaker), just as the same 
proposition may be expressed by two sentences differing 
only in the tense of the verbs (used to fit the varying tem­
poral situation). Thus, the sentence ’There will be a 
recession in 1972’ said before 1972, and ’We had a reces­
sion in 1972’, said after 1972, might be said to express 
the same proposition. In similar metaphors the conditional:
"If the Democrats are right, then there will be a 
recession"
said by Jones who suspects that the Democrats may be right, 
and his retreat:
"Okay, if the Democrats were right, then there would 
be a recession"
(designed by Jones to accommodate the unquestionible views 
were" could be construed as indicative past, or sub­
junctive present.
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of his listener) might be said to express the same propos­
ition. It seems in fact that if one were to mark a dif­
ference in the strength of the two, it would be the one 
with the subjunctive verbs that he would deem the weaker. 
But of course the perceived weakness of the latter lies not 
in the connection Jones alleges but rather in his stand on 
the possibility of the Democrats being right.
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CHAPTER V
One might hold to the view that conditionals with 
subjunctive verbs assert a stronger form of implication on 
the grounds that some uses of the indicative conditional 
(unlike any of those for the subjunctive) can actually be 
identified with the truth-function we call material impli­
cation. Copi, for instance, claims that
Some conditional statements in English do assert 
merely material implications, as for example
•If Communist China is a peace-loving nation, then 
I * m a Dutchman1 
This sort of conditional is ordinarily intended as 
emphatic or humorous method of denying the truth 
of its antecedent for it always contains a notorious 
or ridiculously false statement as a consequent.
But if the assertion here is merely the truth-functional 
claim of material implication, then it should not fade when 
tb.e "notorious Or ridiculously false statement" is replaced 
by a less ridiculous statement, e.g."...then China is a U.N. 
member." Moreover, if Copi’s example expresses merely a
* material implication, then its truth follows simply from 
the falsity of its antecedent, thus the truth-value of its 
consequent is quite irrelevant. Also, note that the force 
of this conditional as a rhetorical devise actually depends, 
like modus tollens,on the one feature that is common to 
material implication and to all conditionals: the whole 
compound is false if its antecedent is true and its con­
sequent false. When someone, affirms a conditional 'If p
••■Irving Copi, Symbolic Logic. Macmillan Co. 1965, 2nd ed. 
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then q* where it is assumed by all that *q* is false, he 
is simply inviting a mental application of modus toilers 
to focus attention on the passion in his belief that *p* is 
false; the rhetorical purpose of which is to deny his 
opponent the opportunity to return with a polite reply 
expressing agreement with the last remark while he contin­
ues disagreement on the point at issue, that is, to pre­
clude a reply such as:
"Yes, that is probably true, but of course it doesn't 
rule out p."
The consensus that 'q* is false and acceptance of 'If p, 
then q* would indeed rule out p . To illustrate the point 
let us suppose that Smith, in a still cool argument, firmly 
assertsi
"If the Chinese are honest, then I'm a monkey's uncle"
Thus, confronted with this strong assertion, the champion 
of Asian sincerity, who naturally tries to accommodate 
rather than refute the more strongly held convictions of 
his opponent, is faced with the prospect of either point­
ing out the number of characteristically simian features 
in the progeny of Smith's brother, and thereby consider­
ably raising the tone of the argument, or simply giving 
up the attempt to get across his point; for if he doesn't 
want to assume the task of refuting the conditional but 
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wants to maintain the truth of its antecedent, 'The Chinese 
are honest*, then he has to uphold the claim in the con­
sequent, viz. that Smith is a jnkey’s uncle. The dilemma 
forced by the rhetorical assertion of such conditionals 
thus depends upon the property which is shared by all con­
ditionals, and not just by those asserting material impli­
cations, i.e.that the compound cannot be true if the ante­
cedent is true and the consequent is false.
The claim that some indicative conditionals are pro­
perly construed as truth-functional compounds is also often 
supported by a consideration of conditionals used to make 
promises, bets, or predictions. The plausibility of con­
struing an indicative conditional as a material implication 
is actually at its best when the condional in question is 
being used for the expression of a promise, a bet, or a 
prediction, especially if there is no firm test for its 
truth when the antecedent clause is false. Thus, when the 
store manager promises:
If your washer breaks before 1970, we will fix it without 
cost.
the material construal may appear quite plausible; for there 
is no obvious way of proving him insincere if the antece­
dent is unfulfilled. In fact, if we let *T* correspond to 
'promise not broken,* or 'prediction does not fail,* and 
'F* correspond to 'promise broken,* or 'prediction fails;' 
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then we actually obtain the standard truth-table for mater­
ial implication. The promise can't be broken, nor can the 
prediction fail if the antecedent ib false, i.e. if the 
washer does not break before 1970. And this may be all 
anybody really cares about in such cases. But, if one is 
concerned about the question of truth or falsity, *T' must 
correspond to ’conditional true* and *F* to ’conditional 
false.’
In bets or predictions where there is a firm inde­
pendent way of- determining the truth value of the conditional 
in question, e.g. when Sadie claims:
a) If Tom rides the Clover Hill mare he will win the 
Derby
the simple falsity of the antecedent clause is not likely 
to draw assent to the conditional as a whole, but rather 
the investigation of some matter relevant to the content 
of the conditional, for example, the order of finish at 
the May Day Derby will likely decide the issue. It is 
important to note that if (a) were treated in the common 
conversational situation as a material implication, then 
we would interpret George’s reply: 
b) Tom would never ride the Clover Hill mare 
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as a show of agreement since it logically entails the truth 
of (a) materially construed. But (b), it must be admitted 
has the quality of an objection« Of course, it is not an 
objection to the claim in (a), but rather an objection to 
Sadie's ability to entertain the assumption that Tom might 
ride a horse o^med by the philistines at Clover Hill, and 
thus indirectly to the mood of the conditional. George may 
agree with Sadie that the Clover Hill mare is the fastest 
entry in the May Day Derby, and thus also that Tom would 
win on her, but his belief in (b) does not commit him to 
Sadie's claim in (a), as it would if (a) were merely a sim­
ple truth-function like material implication.
It may well be difficult to say what the test of 
truth is when the antecedent clause is false in a condit­
ional such as:
If your washer breaks, we will fix* it without cost
but it is surely no different from that for:
If your washer had broken , we would have fixed it with­
out cost.
Here the occasion of utterance is of course different, but 
not the conditional, the grounds for its truth, or its 
truth-value. Lacking an easy way of determining this truth- 
value does not justify our forthwith assuming one. We can­
not bridge a gap in our knowledge merely by calling it a 
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truth-value gap.
The truth of a conditional, whether indicative or sub­
junctive, simply does not follow from the falsity of its 
antecedent clause. For an ordered sentence compound whose 
truth does follow from the falsity of its antecedent, we 
must look to a sentence like:
•The moon is green* materially implies ‘The moon is not 
green.'
or to ‘if-then1 compounds uttered by someone who indicates 
that he wishes to be so understood.
Perhaps, the complexity of the conditional idiom is 
more readily grasped with those conditionals in which the 
verbs happen to occur in the subjunctive. But the shift 
from the indicative:
"If a is an F, then it is a G"
to the subjunctive:
"If a were an F, then it would be a G." 
is more clearly prompted by a shift in opinion as to whe­
ther a is an F, rather than by a shift in opinion as to 
the adhesive quality of the bond between F’s and Q’s.
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CHAPTER VI
How do we decide whether a conditional is true or 
false? We know that any conditional with true antecedent 
and false consequent is false. The conditional:
"If Willoby eats the fish, he will die"
is definitely false if Willoby ate the fish, but did not 
die, i.e.,if the antecedent is true and the consequent 
false. None of the other three truth-value combinations 
(TT, FT, or FF) delivers a decisive verdict. For the case 
in which both antecedent and consequent are found to be 
true one might suppose that the question about the condi- 
ional as a whole could be decisively answered in the affirm­
ative, as when Willoby eats the fish and dies a few hours 
later. But such a hasty confirmation would be in error; 
it overlooks the possibility that Willoby did not die be­
cause he ate the fish, but because of an automobile accident, 
a stray bullet, heart attack, or some other unfortunate 
event while the fish in question was actually quite edible.
If the case of the conditional with true antecedent 
and consequent had such an obvious solution, it would be 
just as obvious for the case of its contrapositive in which 
the antecedent and consequent are both false, e.g. for:
"If Willoby does not die, then he did not eat the 
fish"
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Actually there are only two truth-value combinations that 
need to be considered for a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the truth of a conditional. Every condi­
tional with true antecedent and consequent will have an 
equivalent in its contrapositive with false antecedent and 
consequent, and the formal truth conditions for the one 
are the formal truth conditions for the other. The case 
of true antecedent and false consequent has already been 
decided. Thus, we can simplify our discussion, without 
loss of territory, by, confining it to conditionals in which 
the antecedents are false.
It may be helpful to begin by considering how a per­
son who asserts a conditional, ’If ’A* were true, then 'C 
would be .true.*, might go about justifying his assertion to 
someone who questions its truth. We might imagine that 
his defense proceeds as follows:
1(1) Suppose that A.
2(2) We've agreed that B.
3(3) Note that *L* is a law or a general principle of 
. which ’If A and B, then C is an ' 
instance,
1,2,3(4) Thus, with our initial assumption we can infer C. 
2,3(5) Therefore, we can say if A, then C.
This ploy is usually collapsed, in everyday conversation, 
but it is still the informal analogue of the method used 
for conditional proof. The antecedent of the conditional 
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to be deduced is assumed tentatively as a premise to illus­
trate the consequences of this assumption. Then some 
statements we assert categorically are introduced as pre­
mises. Any consequence of the total set of premises, can 
then be taken as the consequent of a conditional using the 
original assumption as its antecedent. The resulting 
conditional thus depends only on the premises granted cate­
gorically in the first lines of the deduction. With this 
analogy in mind we might design a criterion for conditionals: 
A conditional "If 'A* were true, then 'C* would be true" 
(where ’A* is actually false or contrary-to-fact) is true 
if and only if there is a deduction of C depending upon the 
assumption A, some general principle or law L, and a set S 
of true sentences presumed, but unstated, in the assertion 
of the conditional?
The problem is now to formulate the general specifica­
tions for membership in the set S, One might naturally 
ask why the simple condition that the sentences in S be 
true is not a sufficient condition, for it would seem to 
make no difference whether S includes every true sentence 
or just those necessary for the deduction of C from A and S.
^So as not to obscure the debt I owe to his valuable 
discussion, and also to facilitate subsequent references 
to his arguments, I am adopting Goodman's notation: " 'A' 
for the antecedent *C' for the consequent and ’S’ for the 
set of statements of the relevant conditions or, indiffer­
ently, for the conjunction of these statements." p 9, Fact. 
Fiction, and Forecast (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1965)
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The answer, put picturesquely, is that the world of the 
false or contrary-to-fact antecedent is not described by 
the sentences that happen to be true for this world. Put 
more concretely, since A is false, -A will be true; and 
with A and -A among the assumption sentences, there will 
be no sentence C that cannot be deduced from A*S. Thus, 
every conditional would be deemed true with the simple rule 
proposed. Unfortunately, it is only slightly less naive 
to suppose that this consequence can be avoided by specify­
ing that -A not be a member of S. For where Q, is any false 
sentence other than A, both -Q. and Ov-A will be true, and 
thus qualify as members of S, though together they will 
logically entail -A. Therefore, the criterion would still 
fail to mark a distinction between those conditionals which 
are true and those which are false; for every conditional 
with a false antecedent would satisfy the stipulations of 
our rule without a clause restricting -Q. and Ov-A from mem­
bership in S. We must, therefore, add an amendment requir­
ing that A*S be self-compatible, or that S not entail -A:
(I) -(SP-A)
The rule so amended should accomplish the very minimum of 
drawing at least some distinctions.
Conditionals with false antecedent and true conse­
quent present a special problem; for whenever the consequent 
C is true, there will always be a trivial deduction of C 
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from A*S since C as true qualifies as a member of S. Thus, 
we must also include a provision stipulating that S. be com­
patible with -C, or simply that S not entail C:
(II) -(ShC)
The need for amendments (I) and (II) might have been guessed 
in the initial planning, however future revisions will be 
less predictable and more surprising to our preanalytical 
expectations. For instance, Goodman points out that another 
difficulty arises with a conditional beginning:
"If Jones were in Carolina.,.."
The antecedent of such a conditional will be entirely com­
patible with:
a) Jones is not in Carolina.
and with:
b) North Carolina plus South Carolina is identical with 
Carolina.
These taken together as S and conjoined with the antecedent 
allow a deduction of ’Jones is in South Carolina,* hence 
the tentative criterion accepts the conditional:
c) If Jones were in Carolina, he would be in South Caro­
lina
And if we replace ’Jones is not in North Carolina’ with:
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d) Jones is not in South Carolina
then we can also establish the acceptance of the opposing 
conditional:
e) If Jones were in Carolina, he tvould be in North Carolina,
In response to this difficulty W, T. Parry proposed the 
addition of a requirement stipulating that S not follow by 
law from -A.^ This restriction would appear to proscribe 
’Jones is not in South Carolina* and ’Jones is not in North 
Carolina’ if they do, in fact, follow by law from ’Jones 
is not in Carolina’ (as both Goodman and Parry seem to sup­
pose), Nevertheless, Goodman shows that this amendment is 
not enough to insure the rejection of the unacceptable con­
ditionals, (c) and (e).^ He points out that if Jones is 
actually in South Dakota we will have as true, both:
f) Jones is in a state whose name contains the word ’south’ 
and:
g) Jones is in a state north of South Carolina.
Thus, there will still be a deduction satisfying the con­
ditions of the amended rule to establish the opposing,
W. T. Parry, 'Reexamination of the Problem of Coun- 
terfactual Conditional,’ Journal of Philosophy. Vol 54. 
(1957) p. 90
3’Parry on Counterfactuals’ Journal of Philosophy.
Vol 54, (1957), pp442-5
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unacceptable conditionals. For the conditional ’If Jones 
were in Carolina, he would be in North Carolina* there is a 
set S including (g) and the true sentence:
h) Either Jones is in North Carolina, or Jones is not both 
in Carolina and in the state north of South Carolina.
and such that A’S leads by law to C, that is, to 'Jones is 
in North Carolina.’ Therefore, Goodman concludes that we 
must amend the rule with a clause specifying that there be 
"no set S’ compatible with C and with -C, and such that
4
AeS* is self-compatible and leads by law to -C." But notice 
that there being an suitable S such that A’S leads by law 
to. C for both:
i) If Jones were in Carolina, he would be in South Carolina.
and:
j) If Jones were in Carolina, he would be in North Caro­
lina.
does not guarantee us a suitable S’ for each of these, 
such that A»S’ leads by law to -C. The consequents of the 
two conditionals unfortunately are not direct denials of 
one another. The appropriate sentence S’ for (i), accord­
ing to Goodman's proposal, must be compatible with C,
kelson.Goodman, Fact. Fiction, and Forecast.(Indian- 
apolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) p. 13,
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•Jones is in South Carolina, and yet when conjoined with 
•Jones is in Carolina* must lead by law to -C, 'Jones is 
not in South Carolina*. Such a sentence would seem to be 
hard to find. Nevertheless, consider the sentencei
k) Jones is west of South Carolina.
Strictly speaking, (k) is logically compatible with ’Jones, 
is in South Carolina*. The incompatibility only arises if 
we add some principle about the two-place predicate ’is 
west of1 such ast
1) (x) (y) (if x is west of y, then x is not in y)
With this as the appropriate non-logical law, A*S* leads 
to -C, that is to ’Jones is not in South Carolina.’ Thus, 
(i) is rejected with the rule amended as Goodman suggests.
Likewise (j) is rejected as demonstrated when S' is ’Jones 
is west of North Carolina*. Note that we are assured of a 
suitable S’ for all similar conditionals about Jones or 
anyone who is hot in Carolina. For if the person in ques­
tion is not in Carolina, he will either be north, south, 
east, or west of the Carolina under mention, and there is 
a non-logical law identical with, or parallel to, (1) for 
each of these cases. One might wonder then whether the 
amendment is too strong, whether it causes the rejection 
of some acceptable conditionals along with its rejection 
of the unacceptable conditionals we have been focusing on 
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so narrowly. Consider for example a conditional such ast
m) If Jones were in Carolina, but not in South Carolina 
he would be in North Carolina.
which would appear to have impeccable credentials. Indeed, 
we need only add to the antecedent the true sentence 'North 
Carolina plus South Carolina is identical with Carolina* 
to obtain a deduction of the consequent. But, as just noted, 
we are assured here of a suitable S’ such that A'S* leads 
by law to -C. Hence without Goodman’s amendment, the rule 
admits unwelcome conditionals like (i) and (j); but if it 
is instituted, then conditionals like (m), which would ob­
viously be true, are nevertheless wrongly deemed false.
With the amendment, our rule is too stern, without it, too 
lax: either way it is overly democratic in not favoring 
the true over the false.
Something has gone afoul, and the problem seems to 
stem from the fact that in each of these cases S’ alone 
leads by law to -C. The appropriate deduction would seem 
to be one in which A must play a leading role. Thus, we 
might modify Goodman’s amendment with the stipulation that 
AeS*. but not S’ alone, lead by law to -C.
The rule now allows for die proper acceptance of (k), 
but the desired rejection of (i) and (j) appears uncertain. 
To demonstrate the exclusion of (i), for example, we would 
need to find some true sentence £.’, such that the assumption 
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’Jones is in Carolina1 , (which would normally lend credence 
to Jones is in South Carolina*) is essential to the infer­
ence of ’Jones is rot in South Carolina*. It seems doubt­
ful that there is such a sentence. Possibly Goodman finds 
the way out through the definition of some special non- 
logical law. But, as mentioned earlier, that investiga­
tion is beyond the scope of this paper. Perhaps there is 
no general solution for conditionals of this sort. At any 
rate, we can return to this question after considering a 
number of other difficulties, the solution ofvhich may yield 
an answer
CHAPTER VII
Apart from the problem of defining the nature of non- 
logical law, the major problem concerning conditionals is 
usually taken to be the problem of cotenability. This is 
the problem of specifying without vicious circularity the 
true statements that will, and the true statements that 
will not, withstand the assumption that the false or con- 
trary-to-fact antecedent is true, Goodman explains that 
the problem of cotenability arises in the familiar case 
where we would affirm:
(i) If match m had been scratched, it would have lighted.
but deny: 
(ii) If match m had been scratched,it would not have been 
dry. 
t
The rule should provide for the acceptance of (i) and the 
rejection of (ii) in the familiar case we are supposing, 
but, as Goodman points out, the latter passes the test of 
the tentative criterion. We may have as an element in S 
the true sentence "Match m did not light," and then as A-S:
Match m is scratched; it does not light; it is well made; 
oxygen enough is present...etc.
from which by means of a legitimate general law we can 
infer:
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m was not dry.
Goodman suggests that the trouble is caused by including a 
true sentence in S ('It does not light*) which would not be 
true if A were true, that is to say, a sentence not coten­
able with A. He notes that this sentence is not excluded 
from S with the tentative rule, and that the unwanted coun- 
terfactual would thus-be established as "there would seem 
to be no suitable set of sentences S’ such that A*S* leads 
by law to the negate of the consequent."
My objection to this is simply that there is a suit­
able set of sentences S' such that A*S' leads law to -C. 
Take, for instance, the set S' which has as its sole member:
Match m lighted.
Clearly, S* is logically compatible with C and with -C, that 
is with:
Match m was not dry
and with;
Match m was dry.
Also, S' as such certainly does not follow from -A, (Match m 
was not scratched'), and it is of course compatible with
^Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. (Indian­
apolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) pp. 15-17
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A. Nevertheless, with the conjunction of A and S’, i.e., 
with:
Match jn was scratched and m lighted
and an equally legitimate general law, we can infer -C, 
that match m was dry. For if it is known of a certain match 
that it was scratched and lighted, then it can be inferred 
that the match in question must have been dry. Therefore 
our finding a suitable set S', such that A*S* leads by law 
to -C, shows that the unwanted conditional is not, as Goodman 
supposes, .accepted by his tentative rule.
There may be some discomfort with this rejection due 
to a suspicion that the sentence ’Match m lighted’ would 
be false in the familiar case we are imagining for the sake 
of Goodman’s argument. For no obvious reason, however, 
Goodman never requires that S’ be true in the several for­
mulations of his tentative rule. One suspects, neverthe­
less, that Goodman may have assumed this as a requirement 
especially since (i) would be found unacceptable on his 
rule if the false sentence *m is wet' were suitable for S'. 
Let us thus discount the foregoing as a legitimate rejec-r 
tion of the unacceptable conditional, for there is no 
reason not to institute the standard of truth for the mem­
ber sentences of S’.
, Is there still a suitable set S* for (ii), such that 
A»S* leads by law to the negate of its consequent? If there 
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is no such set, then vze must face the problem of finding a 
non-circular definition of cotenability. But the moment of 
confrontation is still well into the future, for there is 
a set S* that meets all the conditions of the amended rule. 
Consider the set S’ containing the disjunction:
Some undry matches light when scratched, or m was dry.
This must be true in the case we are supposing since the 
truth of the second disjunct is necessary for the truth of
(i) , the acceptable conditional. The set S’ selected for
(ii) here also accords with all the provisions in Goodman's 
criterion: it is compatible with C (’m was not dry*) and 
with -C; it does not follow by law from -A (’m is not 
scratched*); and it is compatible with A nevertheless, from 
A*S* and a legitimate general law claiming:
No undry match lights when scratched
we can again infer -C, that match m was dry. Hence the 
illegitimate conditional (ii) is still rejected by the 
tentative rule, even though it lacks a clause covering the 
cotenability of the sentences in S.
However, we cannot now conclude that a problem over 
the cotenability of the sentences in S never arises, for 
the same ploy can of course be used to demonstrate the 
exclusion of (i), the perfectly acceptible conditional, 
with the rule in its present form. In fact, the rule is 
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so strong that no conditional (in which the consequent is 
false) will satisfy the stipulation that there be no suit­
able set S* such that A-S* leads by law to -C. For where 
L is the legitimate general law, and C is false, there will 
always be a sentence -Lv-C. admissible in S’, which will 






Moved by the superfluousness of A in this sequence one 
would naturally think of amending the criterion still fur­
ther by ruling that the deduction of -C depend upon A, or 
more precisely that A*S* lead by law to -C, where S’ alone 
does not lead by law to -C, But this restriction is easily 
evaded. The untoward results are readily illustrated.






Here A obviously plays a key role in the deduction of -C 
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since (2) and (3) do not alone entail -C. Moreover, this 
contrivance is not limited to those conditionals in which 
C is false; the disjunction of -A, -L, and -C is true just 
in case one disjunct, e.g. -A, is true. Thus, there will 
be a set S* of true sentences for every conditional such 
that A*S'. but not S' alone, leads by law to -C; therefore, 
every conditional will be rejected by the rule. To avoid 
this unhappy situation, we can discard the amendment re­
quiring the non-existence of the set S'. Goodman intro­
duced this amendment to exclude the unacceptable conditionals 
speculating upon Jones* probable whereabouts in Carolina.
But the provision failed in its intent unless the consequentsi
...Jones is in South Carolina
and
...Jones is in North Carolina
can be counted as direct denials of one another. But they 
cannot. Of course the unacceptable conditionals about Jones 
would be excluded by the rule with Goodman’s amendment, 
but the exclusion has nothing to do with the specific na­
ture of these conditionals as unacceptable, but rather 
derives from the fact that they are conditionals, and all 
conditionals are unacceptable according to the criterion 
with Goodman’s amendment.
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Unfortunately> dispensing with the non-existence 
clause has done little to improve our situation. The 
abbreviated rule simply errors now in the other direction; 
it accepts every conditional; for there is an analogous 
formula which will always select a set S satisfying the 
requirements of our rule. No matter what the conditional, 





Goodman acknowledges this problem in the second edition of 
2Fact. Fiction, and Forecast: but he claims that the diffi­
culty can be eliminated if "we add the requirement that 
neither S nor S’ follow by law from -A." The point, however 
seems to deserve more attention; the difficulty cannot be 
cast aside so easily. Goodman’s amendment is at once too 
weak and too strong. It is obviously too weak, since for 
any conditional, S may still be the set containing -AvC and 
some other true sentence P which does not follow by law 
from -A. The most natural proposal to avert this difficulty 
would be to add the stipulation that no member of the set S 
follow by law from -A; but, as it will soon be shown, this
-^Goodman, O£, cit.. p. 13
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is hardly sufficient. That Goodman's rule is too strong, 
is not at once so apparent. The argument, however, is sim­
ple. Suppose it is found that a certain piece of metal c 
conducts electricity. Consider the hypothesis:
(iii) If c is not copper, then some pieces of metal which 
are not copper conduct electricity.3
The warrant for this conditional would usually be that its 
antecedent plus the true sentence S:
Piece of metal c conducts electricity
together entail the consequent, that some pieces of metal 
which are not copper conduct electricity. But if the crit­
erion for the truth-* of conditionals includes the require­
ment that Si does not follow by law from -A, then (iii) will 
be rejected, because the natural candidate for S, (*c con­
ducts electricity'), follows by law ('All copper conducts 
electricity*) from -A, that is from 'o is copper.'
It seems we must relax the regulation that S not fol­
low by law from -A, most naturally perhaps by requiring 
only that -A not entail S. Hopefully nothing'hinged on 
Goodman's more rigid formulation. There was a suggestion 
to exclude 'Jones is not in South Carolina* as a suitable S 
for the unacceptable conditional:
^This of course may be read "If c were copper,,..." 
since differences in mood, as it was argued earlier, do not 
demand differences in the logical analysis, but rather indi­
cate opinion as to the truth or falsity of the antecedent.
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(iv) If Jones were in Carolina, he would be in North 
Carolina
by,requiring that S not follow by law from -A. But Lt is 
quite doubtful that there is really a non-logical law by . 
which 'Jones is not in South Carolina* can be inferred from 
'Jones is not in Carolina'; and even if there were such 
a law, the restriction, as it may be recalled, was easily 
circumvented. Thus, there is no apparent reason why Goodman's 
amendment could not be revised to rule just that neither 
S nor S' be logically entailed by -A. The amendment as 
recast here would still be inadequate since, as noted be­
fore, for any conditional whatsoever, there is a suitable 
set S not entailed by -A and yet compounded so that A'S 
leads by law to C whenever S embraces -AvC and at least 
one true sentence P not entailed by -A. But the loophole 
exploited by chosing S as some multimembered set comprising 
-AvC and true sentences, like 2» and ? (not entailed oy 
-A), can be closed with a simple adjustment. V.here £ is 
the set of true sentences (S^,.e.,Sn), there should be 
no sentence Si such that -A entails Sj_. This is a necess­
ary stipulation, but it needs tightening. It takes the 
inclusive sense of 'or* into account, but not its exclusive 
sense. For where 'o' is taken to represent rhe exclusive 
sense of 'or1, there will always be a set S, viz. the unit 
set of -AoC. which is net entailed by -A, but yet such that 
A»S leads by law to C. Thus, we must elaborate the amendment 
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a bit further, to demand that no member of S be such 
that it is entailed by -A and -C:
(III) -(-A, -ChSt) .
This regulation adequately handles any difficulty arising 
from the use of the exclusive ‘or1. Conditionals with false 
antecedent and true consequent present another special pro­
blem that can be handled by a simple amendment. Wnere C 
is true, -LvC can always be included in S to obtain a set
S such that the conjunction of A, S, and L logically entails 
C; however, we can simply introduce a clause specifying that 
S, and L alone not entail C:
(IV) -(S.LpC)
to insure that -IvC will never be reckoned among the sen­
tences in S. With the addition of this amendment we can 
also drop (II), the stipulation that S alone not entail C.
In sum the tentative criterion should now read that 
a conditional "If *A* were true, ’C would be true" (x-rhere 
•A1 is false or contrary-to-fact) is true if and only if 
there is some general principle or lax^ L and some set S of 
true sentences (Si,...,Sn) such that!
(1) A.S.LbC




Nevertheless, there is still a simple formula for 
finding an acceptable set S to secure for every conditional 
a simple deduction from A*S to C; for where •?’ stands for 
any true sentence not entailed by -A or -C_, counterexamples 
can be generated systematically through the form:
(1) A
(2) (-A-P) v C
C
Clearly it will not help to add an amendment stipulating that 
SjL not follow by law from C: this would be useless because 
another mischievous, but simple, evasion can be carried 
out by taking (-A»P)v(C»P) as a unit in S.
At this point, one might be tempted to introduce a 
piece of legislation to the effect that no member be 
such that it follows from -A and some other true sentence 
P unless S,£ follows from P alone. Indeed, this would in­
sure that an acceptable set S could not contain a sentence 
like (-A,P)vC. but it would also insure that the only accept­
able set for S would be the null set. For where R is any 
true sentence, then AvR is a true sentence such that R 
follows from -A and AvR. but not from AvR alone; hence no 
sentence would qualify as a member of S. A less demanding 




This would exclude sentences such as (-A*P) v C. since 
A*-C logically entails -((-A,P)vC). However, there is a 
class of conditionals which we would intuitively accept as 
true, but yet such that they would not meet the conditions 
of the criterion if this stipulation were added. These 
are conditionals that have an antecedent which alone will 
not entail the consequent, but will when conjoined with 
some true sentence which is not a natural or non-logical 
law. For example, when it is said of a particular ball­
point pen bi
(vi) if pen b does rot write, some ball-point pens do not 
write
This quite reputable conditional would not meet the overly 
rigorous standards of our criterion with the proposed 
amendment. Note that the obvious candidate for S in this 
case i
b is a ball-point pen
is such that its denial, -S, strictly follows from A»-C. i.e. 
from i
Pen b does not write, but every-ball-point pen writes.
56
The requirement that A*~C not entail -S, is obviously too 
strong for those conditionals in which C follows by logic 
alone from A and a sentence describing some relevant fact 
about the situation: (V) will only do for those conditionals 
in which the antecedent A, coupled with the natural set of 
relevant true statements, is presumed to lead by a causal 
or non-logical law to the consequent C. The trouble with 
deductions such ast
(1) A
(2) (-A'P) v C
C
does not lie simply in the fact that A»S entails C without 
reference to a causal or non-logical law; there are many 
wholly acceptable conditionals, like (vi ), for which the 
appropriate set S of true sentences is such that A*S leads 
by a IpRical law to C. The problem lies elsewhere, and it 
is not obvious where it is or just how it can be solved.
The scope of the criterion might be confined to those 
conditionals in which a causal connection is affirmed be­
tween the antecedent and the consequent, and thus to those 
for which A*S is presumed to lead by a non-logical or causal 
law to C. Within this scope, (V) would not be too stern a 
measure, and it would insure the exclusion of (-A*P)vC as 
a possible sentence in S. But besides being a fairly un­
desirable move, there are other serious difficulties that 
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promptly appear when we turn our attention to conditionals 
in which the sequence from antecedent to consequent is the 
one from cause to effect.
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CHAPTER VIII
Consider the fairly absurd, but quite ordinary con­
ditional (at least with respect to the causal ordering)i
(i) If Match m had been scratched, it would have giggled 
without shame, grace, or the proper reserve.
To sharpen focus on the logical features of the problem as 
it arises with such a conditional, we will introduce a set 
of symbols for the relevant open sentences thus:
•Sx* for ’Match x is scratched'
'Dx* for 'x is dry, well-made, and in oxygen*
'Lx* for *x lights*
*Gx* for *x giggles without shame, grace, or the pro­
per reserve*
Now if we suppose *(x) (Sx’Dx-^Lx)* the name of the relev­
ant non-logical law covering the scratching and lighting 
of matches, we can show that- there is a set S which insures 
the acceptance of the absurdity in (i) under our present 
criterion. For by taking S to be the conjunction of 'Dm* 















The problem with our criterion here is that it allows in S 
a true sentence like •-Lm* that is not cotenable with the 
antecedent, that is to say, a sentence which would not be 
true if the antecedent 'Sm* were true. This is the problem 
of cotenability, The solution, nevertheless, seems obvious; 
merely require that S and L not entail -A*
(VI) -(S.LF-A)
since the conjunction of 1(Dm’-Lm)' and *(x)(Sx*Dx->Lx)* 
logically entails *-Sm*. This restriction also allows us 
to discard the first amendment (I) requiring that S not 
entail -A. However, the general problem remains; for the 
illegitimate member of S, the sentence 'Match m did not 
light* (’-Lm*), can now be replaced with ’-Lm v Gm* with­
out violating the strictures of (VI); hence, there is still 
a convenient deduction of *Gm* from A, S, and L, e.g.:
1(1) Sm
• 2(2) Dm*(-Lm v Gm)
3(3) (x)(Sx«Dx->Lx)
1,2,3(4) Lm









Thus, the scandalous conditional, * If match m had been 
scratched, it would have giggled without shame, grace, or 
the proper reserve,1 would be established as true if 
(VI) was adequate.
Goodman's amendment requiring that there be no similar 
set S'such that A»S1 leads by law to -C would indeed pro­
vide for the rejection of (i), but its revival offers little 
advantage, since it would also assure the rejection of the 
acceptable conditional
(ii) ‘If Match m had been scratched it would have lighted*
To help illustrate this rejection, let ’Mx* correspond to
*x loses mass*, and *(x)(Sx»Dx->Mx)* correspond to a non- 
logical law covering the loss of mass by dry, well-made 
matches scratched in sufficient oxygen, then there is a set 
S* containing ’Dm*(-Mm v-Lm)1, which is such that A'S* leads 







The resurrection of the non-existence clause thus offers as 
much loss as profit. The root of our trouble goes deeper 
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than the frivolity of (i) would suggest. While the absurd­
ity of this conditional underscores the inadequacy of our 
formula, it misleadingly belittles the conceptual difficulty 
which might have been better appreciated with a less im­
probable example. The problem here stems from the fact that 
no single event has just one causal consequence. It is not 
only true of a particular, match scratched under favorable 
conditions that it will light, but also that it will lose 
mass, possibly that someone will get burnt, and inevitably 
that the number of unused matches will decrease by at least 
one. The problem this fact presents for an analysis of con­
ditional expressions can be viewed as an aspect of the 
problem of cotenability. For the trouble arises when sen­
tences are permitted in S, (e.g. *-Lm v Mm*) which would 
not be true if the antecedent (e.g. *Sm* were true, in 
other words, when the sentences in S are not •jointly ten­
able’ or cotenable with A. Adding the requirement that S 
be cotenable with A will not solve the problem, for then 
the definition would be tightly circular. Cotenability is 
defined in terms of conditionals, and conditionals as such 
would then be defined in terms of cotenability. In order 
to determine whether 'If A were true, C would be true' is 
true, we must first decide whether the conditional ’If A 
were true, then S would not be true* is itself true. Thus, 
to establish any conditional, we would always have to deter­
mine the truth of another, and then another one before that 
one, and so on ad infinitum.
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The problem seems serious, but a number of possible 
solutions suggest themselves. Take, for example, the rather 
unintuitive, but fairly simple ruling, that there be no set 
S* (of true sentences) such that A*S*•-C. but not A*-C 
alone, leads by law to -S. Unacceptable conditionals like
(i) could then be easily rejected, since there is an ap­
propriate set S', namely the unit set of 'Dm', such that 
A«S* *-C. but not A»-C alone, leads by law to -S, i.e. to 










Note that this last condition is at once satisfied by any 
conditional in which A»S logically entails C; for in all 
such cases A»-C alone leads by law to -S, thus, of course 
there can be no set S* such that A»S'»-C. but not A«-C 
alone, leads by law to -S.
The real danger is not that the rule, so amended, is 
too strong, but rather that it is still too weak. The
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untoward results are readily illustrated. Consider a var­
iant on (i), equally scandalous, though a bit more verbosei
(iii) If match m were dry, well-made, in sufficient oxygen 
and scratched, it would have giggled without shame, 
grace, or the proper reserve.
The set S, whose sole member is ’-LmvGm', can be conjoined 
with the antecedent *Sm•Dm*, to obtain a satisfactory deduc­







Moreover, there is no suitable set S' such that A»S* «-C. 
but not A«-C alone, leads by law to -S; for A»-C by itself 







It seems the criterion still requires further revision. 
Narrowing its scope, confining our consideration to causal 
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conditionals, did not rid us of serious difficulties; how­
ever, it may have served to make them more clear.
Note that in the model case where A*S entails or leads 
by non-logical law to C, in such cases S*-C entails or 
leads by non-logical law to -A. The minimal set suitable 
for S will be such that -A is the only significant conse­
quence gained by conjoining S and -C. One might say that 
S is overloaded (or perhaps "loaded") if S»-C has a non­
trivial consequence other than -A. To put the point more 
precisely, let us introduce the term •material consequent.' 
Z is a material consequence of X and Y if and only ifi
(1) X-Yf-Z
(2) -(X l-Z) [X does not entail 23
(3) -(YPZ)
(4) -(ZH’Y)
(5) if X hW but -(Wv-X), and YkU, but -(Ut-Y), then 
-(Z f-W.U)
For example, where X is P«Q, and Y is R-S, none of the 
following consequences of X and Y are material consequences 
of X and Y:




((P’Q) v M) • ((R-S) v N) (5)
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With this definition, we can now say that the appropriate 
set S of true sentences (S^,,..,Sn) is such that*
(VII) Every material consequence of and -C entails or 
is entailed by -A.
This amendment is sufficient for the rejection of (i) and
(iii),  the facetious, but seriously troublesome condition­
als, concerned with the social propriety of m's response 
to scratching. The crucial sentence in S, -Lm v Gm*, for 
both (i) and (iii), was such that S•-0.
1
(-Lm v Gm)•-Gm 
had a material consequence, *-Lm*, not entailing or entailed 
by -A, that is, by 1-Sm*, or by *-(Sm • Dm)*. Hence, the 
unacceptable conditionals are properly proscribed by the 
rule with this new regulation limiting the material con­
sequences of S and -0.
This amendment has another asset which strongly re­
commends it; this amendment can also be used to exclude 
from S the troublesome sentence (-A»P)vC that almost caused 
us to adopt (V) and abandon the search for a criterion 
that would cover conditionals not assuming causal laws. 
The sentence (-A*P) v 0 is now restricted from S without 
the use of (V) since S•-C as such would have P as a mater­
ial consequence. Thus, the amendment prompted by a diffi­
culty arising from an idiosyncrasy of conditionals affirming 
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a causal connection, turns out to provide a solution for 
the most irksome problem uncovered in attempting to formu­





Having eliminated the need for amendments (I), (II), 
and (V), the proposed rule can be stated in sum as followsi 
a conditional "If 'A'.were true, then ’C’ would be true" 
(where 'A' is false or contrary-to-fact) is.true if and 
only if there is some general principle or law L and a set 





(5) Every material consequence of S: and -C entails
or is entailed by -A, (VII)
The conditions are somewhat involved and possibly redundant. 
This is most likely the result of employing an unintuitive 
ad hoc method of discovery. Perhaps a more stream-lined 
and cogent formulation could have been effected by indulg­
ing in extended reflection on the general traits of the 
real world, preserved and altered in our mental vision of 
the feigned world of the contrary-to-fact antecedent. But 
this method of discovery has severe limitations. Complic­
ated difficulties not guessed in our preanalytical musings 
inevitably arise. Nevertheless, such reflection could 
still be used to argue for and1 against the reasonableness 
and desirability of instituting each, of the various 
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amendments. But there are two important questions which 
must be answered first:
a) Is the rule too strong? Does it reject some condition­
als that would be perfectly acceptable on other grouds?
b) Is the rule adequate? Are there still some unaccept­
able conditionals that are not rejected by the rule?
We have already given considerable attention to (b)? how­
ever, it still deserves some discussion, especially with 
respect to Goodman*s problem of cotenability. But first in 
reply to (a), let us consider some of the more likely 
sources of error in this direction. For example, accept­
able conditionals suggesting where Jones would be if he 
were in Carolina, e.g,
(i) If Jones is in Carolina, but not in South Carolina, he 
is in North Carolina,
The antecedent of (i) coupled with the true sentence for S:
(ii) North Carolina plus South Carolina is identical with 
Carolina
leads by virtue of the non-logical general principle:
(iii) (w)(x)(y)(z)(if(w plus x)=y, then z is in y only if
z is in w or z is in x)
to its consequent, ‘Jones is in North Carolina*, S as such 
now easily satisfies each of the conditions of the pro­
posed criterion; hence, our rule is at last not so demanding 
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as to reject the more acceptable conditionals concerned 
with Jones* probable whereabouts in Carolina.
The unacceptable conditionals, speculating on where 
Jones would be if he were in Carolina, are adequately out- . 
lawed by the requirement that there be no sentence in 
S such that is entailed by -A»-C. For example, in the 
case of the conditional«
(iv) If Jones were in Carolina, he would be in North Caro­
lina
the crucial sentence for S wass
(v) Either Jones is in North Carolina, or Jones is not 
both in Carolina and in a state north of South Caro­
lina
This is now excluded, as it is entailed by -A»-C. i.e., by
(vi) Jones is not in Carolina? and Jones is not in North 
Carolina,
Even if it is insisted that the exclusive sense of ’or* is 
the one in question here, the disqualification of (v) is 
maintained, since -A»-C. entails the denial of the first 
disjunct of (v) and the affirmation of the second.
How, it should now be asked, do those conditionals 
for which A»S is presumed to entail C fare on the proposed 
rule? Consider for example one claiming of ball-point pen b:
(vii) If b does not write, some ball-point pen does not 
write.
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The appropriate choice for S would naturally be the sentence 
*b is a ball-point pen.’ This would plainly satisfy con­
dition that -A*-C not entail S since from -A--Ci
(viii) b writes. Every ball-point pen writes.
we would not infer S, i.e. that b is a ball-point pen ex­
cept on pain of committing the fallacy of affirming the 
consequent. Of course the conjunction of S, and -C:
(ix) b is a ball-point pen. Every ball-point pen writes.
has the material consequence that b writes, but this is 
entailed by -A, i.e., by 'Its not the case that b does not 
write.* .Thus, (vi) satisfies the stipulation in (5). Con­
ditions (l)-(3) are obviously met, hence (vii) is properly 
accepted by our rule.
For a stiff test, let us see how the proposed criter­
ion handles the familiar case Goodman uses to illustrate 
the difficulty over cotenability, the one where for a given 
match ni we would affirm:
(x) If match q had been scratched, it would have lighted.
but deny:
(xi) If match m had been scratched, it would not have 
been dry.
Our criterion must be flexible enough to accept (x) but 
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rigid enough to reject (xi). For convenience in testing 
the criterion in its treatment of these conditionals, let 
the symbolsi
Sx,Lx,Dx,Wx, and Ox
correspond respectively to the relevant open sentences!
Match x is scratched, x lights, x is dry, x is well made, 
and x is in sufficient oxygen.
In the case of (x) the natural cast for S will include 'Dm', 
*Wm*, and 'Om*. These sentences are presumed true in the 
familiar case we are supposing. No one of them is such 
that it is entailed by the conjunction of -A and. -C, i.e. 
by 1 -Sm’-Lm. • Note further that S»-C. * (DnpWnpOm) •~Lm*, 
does not even have -A, ”Sm',.as a material consequence.







Thus, in the familiar case where we would affirm (x), the 
proposed criterion properly accepts the conditional as true.
The unwanted conditional (xi), however is not rejected.
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The requisite set S, consisting of the sentences,
-Lm, Wm, and Oni
satisfies the stipulations in (3)-(5); and A«S» but not S 





Unfortunately, while the criterion is adequate for the pro­
blem of cotenability as it arises in conditionals where a 
causal sequence is involved, e,g, in:
If match m had been scratched, it would have giggled,
the criterion is obviously not sufficient as it stands for 
conditionals such as (xi). Conditionals like (xi), the 
ones Goodman uses to illustrate the problem of cotenabil­
ity, e.g, the conditional in (xi) and:
(xii) If the temperature of bolt b had been 650 degrees 
at t, then it would not have been iron at t,
exhibit what we shall call an inferential sequence, as 
opposed to the causal sequence expressed by ”If m were 
scratched, it would light” and "If b were heated, it would 
expand," We might say that the former affirm the validity 
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of an Inference while the latter affirm the inevitability 
of a certain sequence of events.
While it is true that the proposed criterion is only 
designed to cover the problem of cotenability as it is 
found in conditionals affirming a causal connection, it is 
still adequate for conditionals of inference, like "If 
bolt b did not expand, then it was not heated" if they 
have a contrapositive that expresses a causal sequence, 
e.g. "If b was heated, then it expanded." Moreover, we 
can define cotenability for the remaining inferential con­
ditionals in terms of those conditionals affirming a causal 
sequence. Note for example, how this would take care of 
the troublesome counterfactual«
(xi) If match m had been scratched, it would not have 
been dry.
that Goodman first finds to exhibit the problem of coten­
ability. That the true statement, ’m did not light* is 
not cotenable with the antecedent of this conditional, 
could be determined by the warrant under our criterion for 
the causal conditional:
If match m had been scratched, it would have lighted.
Thus, we can construct a general rule for the conditionals 
of inference by incorporating a clause excluding state­
ments from S vrtiich are not cotenable with A. Circularity 
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can then be avoided by thus defining.cotenability in terms 
of those conditionals asserting a causal connection since 
it was not necessary to institute an explicit restriction 
for S on the statements not cotenable with the antecedents 
of conditionals in this form.
The normal run of conditionals will of course include 
only a) those in which C follows from A*S by logic alone, 
b) those in which a causal connection is affirmed, and c) 
those having a contrapositive in which a causal connection 
is affirmed. For all these, the unamended criterion is 
adequate. Conditionals like (xi) are improbable in prac­
tice, but can, as we have seen, be handled by an amendment 
requiring the contenability of A and S, where cotenability 
is defined in terms of the more usual sort of conditionals.
There is still the problem of defining the natural 
or non-logical laws which we invoke in support of condi­
tionals affirming causal connections. But this is also a 
major problem in a number of other popular projects, e.g. 
in the attempt to construct an adequate model for deduct!ve- 
nomological explanations.
There may be some worth in remarking that many of 
the deductive forms that prompted new amendments to our 
rule can be recast to smoke out similar problems in deduc- 
tive-nomological models. For example, where *L* stands for 
the general covering law, 'E' for the explanandum, and 'P* 
for any statement about a particular fact, we can see that 
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not much labor or material is required to construct "explan­
ations" when we use as our blueprint the relettered version 
of a familiar formula:
(1) L
(2) (-LeP) v E
' E
All such "explanations" fulfill the four conditions Hempel 
and Oppenheim list for a suitable explanation: the explan- 
ans must 1) be true, 2) have empirical content, 3) logic­
ally entail the explanandum, and 4) contain general laws 
required for the derivation of the explanandum.1 To pre­
clude "explanations" contrived under this formula, we might 
draw on our experience with conditionals to recommend a 
fifth condition reminiscent of one from our own rule, e.g, 
that no two premises C^, Cj of the explanans have a mater­
ial consequence not entailing or entailed by C^, or by Cj.
Thus, for this and other problems a map of the twisted • 
road we have traveled might provide guidance for the form­
ulation of an adequate definition of deductive-nomological 
expalantions. Also our difficulty with conditionals of 
inference is paralleled by a problem with the laws covering 
such inferences when used in deductive-nomological explan­
ations .
^-C. G. Hempel and P. Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic 
of Explanation," Philosophy of Science. Vol. 15, 1948, pp 135-
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As a more immediate profit from our venture with con­
ditionals, we now have the means to formulate one of the 
necessary conditions for the truth of elliptical explana­
tions of the form *E because C, (where 'E‘ describes an 
event to be explained and *C* refers to some antecedent or 
concomitant event or state of affairs), for examplei
Willoby died because he ate the fish.
Locutions of this form may be thought of as deductive- 
nomological explanations stated elliptically, that is, omit­
ting mention of relevant assumptions presupposed by the 
explanation, but taken for granted in the context of utter­
ance. We can say that an elliptical explanation ’E because 
C* (where *E* and *C* are both fulfilled) is true only if 
the conditional ’If C, then E* is true by our definition. 
This obviously wouldn’t do as a sufficient condition since 
we count all conditionals of the form ’If E, then E’ as 
true. Perhaps there are counterexamples to this proposal 
due to peculiarities in the logic of ’because* and the 
variations in what will and what will not satisfy us as 
an explanation. But the appropriate revisions should not 
involve near the labor that the task would entail without 
the support of an analysis for ’if...then.’
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